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On 3 June 2010 a workshop entitled “What Can Development Policy Learn from the 
History of Development” was held at the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) 
Genomics Policy and Research Forum, at the University of Edinburgh.  The aim of the 
workshop was to establish a dialogue between historians of agriculture and academics 
working in development studies. Although members of both disciplines often share an 
interest in large-scale agricultural transformations, they work largely in isolation from 
one another: reading different journals, attending different conferences and inhabiting 
different departments. While the institutional obstacles giving rise to such academic 
tribalism are well-known, the result is intellectually damaging.  Moreover where both 
sides are engaged in policy-relevant research, mutual isolation also weakens policy-
formation. The papers were given by historians from the Netherlands, Canada and the 
UK, followed by a  commentary  from the development anthropologist, Paul Richards.  
The audience was drawn from UK centres of development studies and policy as well as 
from the ESRC Genomics Network. 
 
……………………………………. 
 
Stuart McCook (University of Guelph): ‘The ecology of development: a history of 
“bad” coffee’. 
 
History, according to one succinct definition, is a discipline that seeks to tell “true stories 
about the past”. Stories order events into causal sequences, in order to give meaning to 
complex realities. But these stories also carry risks. As the historian William Cronon has 
argued, stories are fraught with power relations; they sanction some voices and not others 
(Cronon 1992, 1350). Recent popular and academic discourse about the global coffee 
industry and development illustrate strengths and weaknesses of narratives about 
commodities and development. 
 
The dominant narrative in recent academic and popular studies of the global coffee 
industry has been the rise of high-quality specialty Arabica coffee since the 1980s and, as 
a subset of that, the emergence of ‘ethical’ coffees such as Fair Trade, Certified Organic, 
Rainforest Alliance (Pendergrast 1999; Luttinger and Dicum 2006; Jaffee 2007). This 
narrative runs as follows: In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a widespread initiative to 
technify coffee production. This produced a host of economic and ecological problems. 
The specialty and ethical coffees emerged in response to these problems. Specialty 
Arabica coffees thus appear as ‘good’ coffees in several senses: they not only taste good, 
but they are also presented as being economically, ecologically, and ultimately morally 
good. Meanwhile, Robusta coffee usually appears as the counterpoint: the ‘bad’ coffee, 
known for poor or indifferent quality, and usually purchased by large coffee roasters as 
cheap filler in low-grade supermarket blends or for instant coffee.  
 
The central problem with this story is not that it is wrong: the specialty revolution did 
encourage many producers to improve the quality of their coffee, and ethical coffees have 
indeed made a significant difference to the landscapes where they are produced and to the 
people who produce them. The problem is that story is not representative of the coffee 
industry as a whole.  Generous estimates suggest that specialty coffee only accounts for 
about 20% of global coffee production, and is localized in Central America and Mexico, 
Kenya, Ethiopia, and a few other areas. Brazil’s vast coffee industry, and producers 
elsewhere in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific seldom appear in these stories. Voices from 
this (very large) segment of the coffee industry seldom receive the same attention as the 
specialty industry.  
 
But middling and poor-quality coffees have played a tremendously important role in 
promoting different models of ‘development’ since the early twentieth century, and 
continue to offer potential for development in the future - even if these development 
models differ from those of the specialty coffee market.  Robusta coffees are the single 
largest sector of the coffee market; at the time of writing they accounted for about 35% of 
global coffee production. Millions of farmers – in Vietnam, in Indonesia, India, the Ivory 
Coast, Angola, and Brazil – make their living growing Robusta coffee. For that reason 
alone, this segment is worth serious and systematic attention.  
 
The history of Robusta coffee represents a model of economic development in which 
coffee plays a starkly different role from that of the specialty Arabica markets. Robusta 
was first cultivated on a large scale in the Dutch East Indies, after an epidemic of the rust 
disease, caused by the fungus Hemileia vastatrix, wiped out most of the colony’s Arabica 
farms (McCook 2006). As Europeans established colonies in Africa in the early twentieth 
century, Robusta coffee became a tool of choice for bringing peasant farmers into the 
market economy: Uganda, the Belgian Congo, the Ivory Coast and Angola all produced 
significant amounts of Robusta. After World War II, the emergent leaders of African 
states also embraced Robusta cultivation as a vehicle for national development. In 1953, 
the future president of the Ivory Coast, Felix Hophouet-Boigny, enjoined his compatriots 
to “concentrate your efforts on growing good cocoa and coffee. They will fetch a good 
price and you will become rich” (Pendergrast 1999, 259). That decade, the Ivory Coast 
quadrupled coffee production to become one of the world's largest producers. In more 
recent years, the largest single story has been the emergence of Vietnam, which began 
promoting colonization and coffee cultivation in its central plateau in the early 1980s. In 
the ensuing three decades, Vietnam has overtaken Colombia to become the world’s 
second largest coffee producer after Brazil. This expansion was driven by the Vietnamese 
government and often funded through bilateral aid programs (Doutriaux et al. 2008). The 
Robusta industries of Indonesia and Brazil have also grown rapidly during this period, 
and recently the Mexican government has announced its intention to expand Robusta 
coffee production in areas where Arabica coffee is not viable. 
 
The point here is not to criticize the story of specialty coffee, nor to cast Robusta coffee 
as being somehow ‘good’. Rather, it is to illustrate the power of stories to define what 
matters and what does not – and the risks that this carries. The dominant stories told 
about the global coffee industry these days tend to privilege a small segment of the 
whole, and to overlook or downplay some of the industry’s most significant and dynamic 
sectors. The brief counter-narrative of Robusta presented above hints at the importance of 
taking this segment of the global coffee economy seriously, and exploring the 
opportunities for development work that it presents. More generally, it suggests the need 
to pay close attention to all narratives of development, and to attend carefully to the 
voices that are silenced as well as those that are sanctioned.   
………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Harro Maat (University of Wageningen): ‘The rice genome and its history; mutual 
benefit and policy implications’. 
 
From a historical point of view, the role of research in agricultural development is quite 
recent. Following the establishment of agricultural research stations, agricultural schools 
and extension services in Europe during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
colonial powers introduced similar organisations in their overseas territories. Although 
examples exist of similar developments in other times and places, the historiography is 
dominated by studies on the colonial period and the involvement of post-1945 
international development institutes. For understanding the evolution and development of 
rice, a plant in use as a food crop for several millennia, an emphasis on the last five 
decades or at best the last century of this longue durée process can only result in a partial 
understanding of that history. Therefore, looking back further in time is necessary for a 
better understanding of the history of rice as a food crop. This implies the opening up of a 
vast research area that so far is explored by very few scholars. For today’s development 
challenges, the important questions include: what actors are involved in processes of 
changing cultivation patterns, introducing new rice varieties or changing the conditions in 
which rice production and consumption takes place? From our current standpoint one 
might expect that state organisations and Western science are key players, but from a 
wider temporal perspective the various other actors, most prominently farmers and 
merchants, have been much more influential in shaping the rice crop and the ways it is 
cultivated. Who exactly these actors were and what they did is largely understudied (apart 
from Bray 1986, Boomgaard and Henley 2004). 
 
Reconstructing the history of rice varieties and their cultivation can benefit from 
exchanges with bio-science disciplines. By combining historical information with 
information from botany and genetics, our historical accounts become more persuasive 
(for instance upon policy makers).  In the case of rice, genetic techniques have already 
produced interesting insights into the origins of  the different species and sub-species that 
make up the current genetic stock of rice across the world. Conversely, historical analysis 
can contribute to understanding the genetic evolution of rice by showing how this process 
is affected by a range of social, economic and political factors. 
  
Genetics and history converge particularly around the domestication of rice, a process in 
which the characteristics of both the rice plant and rice-growing societies interact. Results 
from domestication studies using gene sequencing techniques and available genetic 
information has led to a debate about how and where Asian rice (Oryza sativa) originated 
and whether single or multiple events led to domestication. Such studies have immediate 
relevance for current rice-growing regions as they reveal important information about 
adaptation to particular climatic and ecological conditions. This is not to suggest that the 
history of rice growing societies can be decoded from genetic analysis but rather to 
suggest that the two fields can complement one another in the information they provide 
and to allow for cross-checking of evidence.  
 
One issue for further exploration is the geographical distribution pattern of genetic 
information. The picture of human interaction with the agricultural and genetic 
development of rice can be studied in more detail for more recent periods. One way of 
doing this is to focus on the relations and exchanges between specific geographical 
regions. Take, for example, the Mediterranean and West-African regions. Rice is a native 
species in West Africa, though only with respect to O. glaberrima (also known as African 
rice).  Domestication of this species took place in the inland Niger delta in Mali. 
Nowadays, African rice is grown next to, and often in combination with, O. sativa, the 
species from which both the indica and japonica subspecies are derived. In the 
Mediterranean region the rice varieties grown are all temperate japonicas of O. sativa.  
These varieties are well adapted to the climate of the Mediterranean. Common to these 
two regions is their connection with Asian rice-growing regions. Thus there is  evidence 
that O. sativa, and with it rice cultivation, reached the Islamic world by the end of the 
first millennium. From there it spread further  to West-Africa as well as Southern Europe 
(Glover and Higham 1996). In recent years work on the analysis of genetic variation in 
rice has been done for the Mediterranean as well as West-Africa.  
 
This work is motivated by the idea that more information about the origins of rice 
varieties in the region can contribute to the improvement of rice cultivation and thus 
contribute to the development of the rice-growing societies in these areas. Similarly, 
historical analysis exploring the origins and dynamics of the social, economic and 
political conditions that jointly shaped the evolution of rice in these regions can 
contribute to the improvement of conditions in today’s rice growing societies. To do so, 
historians need to investigate further the histories of specific locations and regions as well 
as the exchanges between various regions. Where the features of the rice crop are 
determined by gene flow and local adaptation, the features of the rice societies are 
determined by the formation of patterns of social interaction and the institutionalisation 
of these patterns. The tools developed by genetic research and the information that has 
become available on the rice genome have opened opportunities to develop more detailed 
accounts of the interaction between genetic variation and cultivation methods.  
………………………………………… 
 
Jonathan Harwood (University of Manchester):  ‘Do development programmes 
learn from experience? Experts reflect upon the early decades of the Green 
Revolution’. 
 
Designing development projects which succeed in increasing agricultural productivity is 
not easy.  Many observers reckon that most such projects since 1945 have failed. Under 
the circumstances it is obviously important that development planners should be aware of 
which past approaches have worked and which have not. There are scattered indications 
in the literature, however, that this has not generally been the case. A series of  authors 
have complained that many development experts seem unaware of the success or failure 
of approaches pursued only a few years previously (Chambers 2005, Ferguson 1990, 
Porter et al. 1991).   
 
Because this kind of evidence is important but remains anecdotal, I have explored this 
issue more systematically by examining an episode in which development experts sought 
to extract lessons from the first generation of Green Revolution (GR) programmes of the 
1950s and ’60s. As is well known, around 1970 a number of critics took the GR to task 
for failing to help peasant-farmers. If a programme was to reach most smallholders, they 
argued, it had to provide appropriate technology, and the political and economic 
background conditions within which a programme operated were also crucial. The 
question I asked was: how did green revolutionaries respond to this critique during the 
1970s and ’80s? What conclusions did they draw as to how future programmes should be 
designed so as to reach the small farmer?  
 
Their first conclusion, unsurprisingly, was that the way in which programmes were 
organised was crucial. It was regarded as important, for example, that programmes 
should be decentralised. Just as necessary was that a programme’s intended beneficiaries 
also needed to be organised since well-organised peasant-farmers were better able to 
voice their needs and lobby for resources. Moreover the agencies which sponsored 
programmes needed to take the long view; pressure for quick results was generally 
damaging. The second conclusion was that a great deal hinged on the attitudes among 
those who designed programmes as well as those in the field. Arrogance and an 
inclination to dismiss local knowledge had hampered more than a few programmes, and it 
was sometimes compounded by a basic ignorance of the problems faced by small 
farmers. Third, some commentators complained that many programmes failed to take into 
account the political implications of development: for example, that projects aimed at 
resource-poor farmers were vulnerable to capture by local elites. 
 
Although these reflections since the 1970s upon the strengths and weaknesses of the first 
generation of GR programmes yielded valuable insights, the odd thing about them is that 
for the most part they were not actually new. Nearly all of them can be found in 
successful development programmes from an earlier era: the interwar experience of some 
British, French and Dutch colonial agricultural officers; the remarkable agricultural 
development of Japan from about 1880 to 1930; and the Central European movement for 
‘peasant-friendly’ plant-breeding from ca. 1900. Each of these episodes already displayed 
the ‘hallmarks of success’ later identified by green revolutionaries from the 1970s. 
Research and extension in Japan and Europe were decentralised, and in both regions 
much attention was devoted to organising small farmers. When initial attempts to use 
imported western methods failed, scientists in all three contexts turned to promising 
indigenous practices, improving them using scientific analysis. And in Japan and Central 
Europe elite resistance was not a problem since development programmes enjoyed strong 
state support from the beginning. 
 
What, then, is the state of play at the moment? Have past lessons been learned so that 
current development programmes are now better tailored to the needs of resource-poor 
farmers than were those of the 1950s and ’60s? The evidence is not encouraging.  Over 
the last few years a variety of development experts have called, once again, for more 
attention to be given to the needs of small farmers (implying that this has not been a 
priority until recently). And over the last decade a series of reports issued by the World 
Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and International 
Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development 
(IAASTD) have emphasised the importance of fighting poverty and hunger through 
targetting smallholders.  Significantly, their recommended solutions all include 
empowering farmers’ organisations, decentralising development efforts, stronger state 
intervention in many areas and technologies appropriate for the needs of smallholders. 
 
Why, then, this apparent failure to learn from the past? It is probably too crude to say that 
development programmes don’t learn from experience; like any institution, a programme 
is a differentiated entity whose members possess different interests, expertise and 
experience. Thus some parts of the organisation may be better informed about past 
programmes (or technical and political feasibility) than others, or more committed to 
poverty-alleviation. It seems plausible to think of a programme as a hierarchy consisting 
of three levels: 
 
- ‘experts’ with field experience who provide advice to 
 
- ‘planners’ who design programmes, sell them to the donor agency and to the 
host country, and oversee them, and 
 
- ‘decision-makers’ who approve programmes (or not).  
 
Once one disaggregates programmes in this way, it seems likely that those who are aware 
of past experience (experts) often face barriers to implementing that knowledge. Those 
who design programmes are often rewarded for getting them underway quickly rather 
than for making them effective. And those with the power to implement programmes may 
be indifferent to questions of efficacy because for them development projects are less a 
mechanism for poverty-alleviation than a political tool.  
…………………………………………………… 
 
Paul Richards (University of Wageningen): Commentary 
 
At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in Edinburgh in 1997 a delegation of 
the elected government of the West African state of Sierra Leone, exiled by a coup, 
presented to Tony Blair a plan of action intended to cover the first 100 days of its 
restoration to power.  This was the exception that proves the rule - a policy document 
grounded in a careful reading of history.  Post-war policy for the legitimate government 
of Sierra Leone in 1998 was modelled on British colonial policy. In 1898, for example, 
the British put down a rebellion in Sierra Leone and devised a scheme to make traditional 
chiefs the agents of a new pacificatory regime in the interior.  For this, they recruited a 
new class of chiefs, willing to do the bidding of the regime while keeping the peace 
locally through tradition (whereby “tradition” included protecting the rights of a slave-
owning elite empowered through war-lord control of 19th century trade).  And in 1998?  
Once the civil war in Sierra Leone had ended (2000), a British aid programme funded an 
item on the elected government's 100-day plan – the restoration of chiefs to the 
countryside.  Since then the contribution of these ‘defenders of tradition’ has been to 
facilitate a number of land deals involving agribusiness and biofuels.   
 
My point in referring to this story is to inject a note of scepticism about the very idea of 
learning anything from history.  Those we label “policy makers” are the servants of 
politicians, and this ‘art of the possible’ has little use for skills which scientists and 
scholars bring to the table. I hasten to add that this does not mean that the answer to the 
question ‘What can development policy learn from the history of development?’ is 
‘nothing’. My sense is that the real value of this question lies more in what science and 
scholarship can gain from careful comparison, rather than in any hope that policy makers 
pressed by contingency will pay attention to the lessons of history. 
 
The three papers before us are indeed rich in implications for a global analysis of the role 
of science and technology in agrarian development, and the comparative lessons are 
especially enticing.  I was immediately struck by an implicit link in all three papers 
concerning the Cold War, and wondered whether it would be useful to try and bring this 
to the surface more explicitly (cf. Paige 1975). I was thus particularly interested to learn 
from the McCook paper that the International Coffee Agreement emerged in the early 
1960s, among otherwise impeccably free-marketeering commercial coffee interests, 
because of the fear of more Cuban-style communist revolts.  This made me wonder 
whether we can separate out any study of global agro-technology development in this era 
from international politics, as both West and East struggled to establish their own 
distinctive forms of global mercantilism.  I would thus appeal for more cross-institutional 
analysis of plant sciences and crop development, tracing what is common to private and 
public sectors, and to the socialist and so-called “free market” sectors.  Perhaps policy 
makers were not very interested in the lessons of history because they found themselves 
too preoccupied with some of the earliest pitched battles of globalization? 
 
Harwood notes that the older Japanese and German systems were particularly good at 
responding to local signals about farmers’ needs, in part because their scientists often had 
a peasant social background, which seems to imply that this is not true of, say, African 
research stations today.  Paarlberg (2009) has recently given African governments a 
probably well-deserved bashing for their anti-science orientation in regard to their own 
food security needs.  Many regimes do indeed behave with some of the mentality of an 
absentee rentier landlord, stashing the funds overseas, and allowing the peasant small-
holdings to fall into rack-and-ruin for want of proper investment.  But I would hesitate 
before extending the blame to the kind of personnel recruited for work in African 
research stations.  Consistently, African agro-scientists have proven capable - when given 
a chance - of rethinking their task along lines that would exactly fit the best-practice 
models in Japan and Germany. 
 
The papers for this session were decidedly rich, but I was a bit  surprised to note how 
little scientific issues come into the stories told.  The battle for and against Robusta coffee 
unfolds on an epic scale – but where is the science?  No breeding?  No genetic 
engineering to resolve the disease problems?  No agonies over modelled predictions of 
imminent climatic catastrophe?  I also wondered whether the case for the decentralization 
of breeding was as simple as portrayed in the Harwood paper. For it seems to overlook 
the importance of phenotypic responsiveness to a broader or narrower set of 
environmental conditions (Stearns 1989). For example, green revolution breeders 
discovered broad adaptation through shuttle breeding and turned it into a trade-mark 
speciality, and broadly and narrowly adapted varieties are known among farmer crop 
types as well. There are thus strengths and weaknesses associated with both widely and 
locally adapted plant types.   
 
So, what is the bottom line?  Development policy makers have quite blatantly ignored the 
agricultural sector for the best part of 20 years (other than to assert that commercial 
biotechnology would solve any outstanding agrarian problems).  In the past few years, 
however, attitudes have started to shift, and poverty-alleviation is again on the agenda. Is 
it thus time to try and distil the lessons of agrarian history?  Rather than trying to catch 
the ear of policy-makers, it may be more useful for historians to try to establish links with 
a user community comprising both agro-technologists and peasant farmers, appealing 
over the heads (or beneath the gaze) of those who engineer policy.  Perhaps the latters’ 
incapacity to make use of history is actually an asset, leaving the field clear for those 
determined to pursue other options? 
……………………………………… 
 
Discussion 
 
The formal presentations were followed by a lively and wide-ranging discussion that 
confirmed that historians and development academics have much to say to one another. 
In summarising these discussions, we can identify three distinct but related themes: 
 
First, any evaluation of the success or failure of previous agricultural development 
initiatives may depend heavily on what historical or sociological perspective one adopts. 
Early critiques of Green Revolution initiatives were generally based on a short-run 
assessment, but longer-run developments have problematised these critiques. While such 
initiatives generally failed in meeting their professed aims of promoting rural 
development and alleviating rural poverty, for instance, they appear to have been more 
successful in feeding urban populations and thereby supporting industrialisation. 
Effective evaluation may also need to consider conflicting aims, for instance where 
bringing marginal land under production may pose a threat to biodiversity or ecosystem 
services. Evaluation should also take account not just of factors such as crop yield and 
productivity, but also issues such as social organisation and infrastructural development. 
Retrospective evaluations may thus need to be extremely complex, and to take account of 
a number of different perspectives.   
 
Secondly, the course of any particular development initiative my be profoundly 
influenced by the organisation and internal politics of the various agencies involved. 
Historical accounts of such initiatives may therefore need to take account of a wide range 
of social and institutional factors including, for instance, the rapid turn-over of ministers 
and civil servants, the influence of ‘street-level bureacrats’, and the often different views 
adopted by different actors within a single organisation. However, historians wishing to 
develop analyses at this level of detail may face serious problems of access as 
governments and development agencies close their doors in the face of continuing 
criticisms of development policy.   
 
Thirdly, at the opposite end of the micro-macro spectrum, large scale economic and 
political factors may also be crucial. The dominance of neo-liberalism in policy means 
for instance that research for agricultural development tends to follow commodity prices 
rather than need. At the same time, the global politics of market structuration and the 
continuing influence of the global North remain crucial in determining commodity prices. 
Historical accounts of agricultural development will therefore need to attend to such 
factors, as well as to institution-level structures and politics.   
 
Finally, if historical analyses are to impact on policy itself, historians will need to 
consider what kinds of narratives may be effective in capturing policy makers and 
development practitioners. Policy-makers, in particular, appear to suffer from systematic 
amnesia and highly selective remembering. History is commonly understood to start at 
Bretton Woods, while the ascendancy of neo-liberalism and the rejection of the role of 
the state have led to the writing-out of previous histories. Meanwhile, new organisations, 
especially those such as the Gates Foundation which place particular emphasis on the role 
of science, appear equally uninterested in learning from history. It seems that policy 
makers tend to favour simple causal stories and linear narratives at the expense of more 
complex analyses, while long-term historical perspectives may be of little interest for 
agencies concerned with securing quick results.   
 
Continuing dialogue between historians and policy academics offers one way of 
developing shared narratives that can be used to counter the short-termism, linear 
thinking and neo-liberal assumptions that continue to underpin much development policy 
and practice. It is clear that development policy cannot continue as at present, and the 
time may be ripe for alternative narratives to secure acceptance among policy makers and 
practitioners alike. The organisers of this workshop are already planning ways of taking 
forward these discussions, and we will welcome input from any readers of Food Security 
who wish to contact us.   
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